JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS CREATED
BY ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

I. GROWInG INTMEEST nT ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS
Man, by his ever increasing technological skills, has created both
the need for and the ability to make artificial islands. An artificial
island is simply a fabricated island, constructed either of dirt and
rock dredged fro mthe sea bottom, or of steel such as the common
off-shore oil platforms. It is a non-naturally formed object, permanently attached to the seabed, completely surrounded by water
with its surface above the water at all times.1
There have been several attempts to create independent nations
off the coast of the United States on artificial islands.2 Two competing concerns tried to establish a gambling resort on a sunken
coral reef four-and-one-half miles off the Elliot Key of Florida.
Another enterprise tried, also unsuccessfully, to establish a taxfree nation 120 miles off the cost of California for the purpose of
harvesting and processing abalone and lobster.8 Off the coast of
Bimini in the Bahamas lies the derelict hulk of a ship which was
4
supposed to be grounded on a reef to create an artificial island.
These plans went awry but as fate would have it the ship later
grounded unintentionally during a storm. It was used by liquor
smugglers during prohibition, then later it was the subject of
plans to create a night club with an aquarium below.; There have
1. In contrast, Article 10 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone states that: "An island is a naturally-formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide." Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; [1964] pt. 2,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Done at Geneva April 29,
1958; entered into force June 10, 1964.
2. Stang, The Individuals Right to Question United States Administrative Jurisdiction Over Continental Shelf Areas, in THE LAw OF =E SEA:
Tns FUTURE OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES 86 (Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1967); Recent Case, 6
SAN DiEno L. REv. 487 (1969). See also McNichols, Alantis: Ave Atque
Vale, OCEANs (No. 6) (1971) at 67.
3. Recent Case, supra note 2.
4. Stephens, Bimini's Concrete Wreck, OCEANS (No. 1) (1969) at 22, 27.
5. Id.
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been several instances of radio stations being set up on artificial
islands off the coasts of Western European nations. 6 In the
Bahamas, an artificial island has already been created from materials dredged from the sea bottom. 7

Its creator plans to increase

its size to 200 acres and has an agreement with the Bahamian
government to build eleven more."
Many other artificial islands have been proposed for a variety of
purposes, and some possible applications have been extensively
studied. Great Britain is considering proposals for a city of 30,000
fifteen miles off her coast, built on an artificial island.9 It is felt
that such cities may be necessary to accommodate growing populations by providing added building space.' 0 Scripps Institute of
Oceanography has plans for a park in the ocean which will utilize
an artificial island for observation and research." Due to expensive nuisance suits and increasing use, airports need locations away

from the cities, but must at the same time be near enough to serve
population centers. Recently a study recommended seven possible
sites for an offshore airport for San Diego.12 Offshore atomic
power plants for New Jersey and Florida have been studied.'3 It is
felt that they may solve some of the environmental problems created by atomic reactors and still supply needed power to coastal
cities.' 4 Several comprehensive studies of the possibility of using
artificial islands as offshore superports for handling the new super
tankers have been made. Canada has plans for a fifty acre superport.:5 Louisiana' 6 and the Maritime Administration 7 have also
made detailed studies of superports.
6. Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in European Waters, 14 INv'L &

ComP. L.Q. 410, 411-12 (1965).

7. New York Times, April 6, 1970, at 41, col. 1. As will be discussed
infra, artificial islands associated with the extraction of minerals have a
special status in international law.

8. Id.
9. Nettleton, Cities to Live in, Building Cities on the Oceans, CumExuT,
May 1972, at 36.

10. Id. at 43.

DIEGo MAGA wNE, July 1972, at 78.
12. San Diego Union, April 18, 1972, § B, at 1, col. 8.
13. New York Times, March 16, 1972, at 1, col. 2; New York Times,
May 26, 1972, at 48, col. 4.

11. SAN

14. Id.

15. 3 MANITOBA L.J. (No. 2) (1969) at 27.
16. Louisiana Superport Task Force, A Superport for Louisiana, June

Superports are an example of one use for artificial islands which
has practically become a necessity. Currently, the only ports in the
United States capable of handling ships of more than 100,000 deadweight tons (d.w.t.) are on the West Coast, and only one of these
can unload a 200,000 d.w.t. ship at berth.1 8 As of 1970, there were
319 ships of more than 100,000 d.w.t. in service, and there were 273
ships of more than 200,000 d.w.t. under construction or on order. 19
The largest ship built to date is 477,000 d.w.t. with a draft of 117
feet.20 Costs of petroleum transportation vary directly in relation
to the size of the ship. The larger the ship, the less the transportation cost per unit. The cost per ton to carry oil from the Persian
Gulf to the United States North Atlantic ports in a 250,000 d.w.t.
ship is less than one half that for a 47,000 d.w.t. ship, which is the
average ship now in use.21 It may be that these super tankers are
a necessity. The demand for oil is becoming so great that it would
be virtually impossible to build all the 50,000 ton ships needed, or to
train crews to man them, and if they were built the ports of the
22
world would become hopelessly congested.
These facts make it clear that there is a need for deep water ports
that can serve these huge ships. It is either impossible or prohibitively expensive to deepen and reconstruct the existing North Atlantic ports 23 to handle super tankers. For these reasons, it seems
very likely that offshore ports will be constructed in the not-toodistant future.
Superports are only one example of the many possible uses of
artificial islands. More important than this variety of uses are the
necessary functions that they can serve. Our modern world is becoming crowded, requiring more usable space and energy. Artificial islands open up new areas for cities. They make available deep
1972 (published by a private group appointed by the Governor-Elect of
Louisiana, The Honorable Edwin W. Edwards).

17. OFFICE

MARITIME

OF PORTS AND

ADMINIsTRATION,

INTERMODAL SYSTEMS, DMSIoN OF PORTS,
U.S.

DEPARTMENT

OF

COMMERCE,

THE Eco-

(1972) [hereinafter cited as MAITIPME ADAUNISTRATIoN STUDY].
See San Diego Union, Nov. 27, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 5;
New York Times, May 19, 1972, at 72, col. 5. President Nixon has proposed
NObVUCS OF DEEPWATER TERMINALS

legislation to permit the Department of the Interior to issue licenses for
superports beyond three miles, San Diego Union, April 19, 1973, § A, at
8, col. 1.
18. MbAumm Aw
ISTRATIoN STUDY, supra note 12, at 17.
19. Id. at 5, 6.
20. San Diego Union, Jan. 13, 1973, § A, at 3, col. 1 (picture story).
21. Louisiana Superport Task Force, supra note 11, at 3; MmuTnME ADINISTRATION STUDY, supra note 12, at 8.

22. Lum= ADBn\
sTATioN STUDY, supra note 12, at 6.
23. MARITIM AmImSTRATION STUDY, supra note 12, at 31.
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water ports for the new super tankers, and provide population-free
spaces near population centers for nuclear power plants and noisy
airports. It is mandatory that the jurisdiction over artificial islands be clarified in order that the international community and individual States may take full advantage of them.
The JurisdictionalIssues
The need for artificial islands and the ability to build them has
created imposing questions of jurisdiction which have not been answered. Jurisdictional issues raised by artificial islands can be
summarized as follows:
Who can build what?
Where can it be built?
What laws will govern?
Who can build what, and where, is a question of jurisdiction to
construct. What laws will govern is a question of jurisdiction to
control. For each particular artificial island project, the following
questions must be answered: Can this particular person or State
build this particular artificial island on the location chosen-and
who can control the activities on it?
II.

UN=TED STATES LAW RELEVANT TO ARTIFIcIAL ISLANDS

Existing law in the United States that is relevant to artificial islands is, for the most part, limited to artificial islands which are
used for exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf.
However, if by international agreement similar to the 1958 Conventions, a regime of complementary State-International jurisdiction over artificial islands for all uses were created, the application
of these existing laws could be extended to cover all artificial islands over which the United States is given jurisdiction.
In general, state laws apply to all structures within three miles of
the coast. The Submerged Lands Act 24 gave the states title and
ownership to the lands beneath the waters extending seaward three
miles, while retaining for the United States authority over navigation, flood control and production of power. 25 Federal laws apply
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1311.

to structures erected to exploit natural resources seaward beyond
three miles.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 20 declared

jurisdiction and control over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf seaward beyond three miles in the United States and
provides that the waters above the outer continental shelf retain
their character as high seas.
It should be noted that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
applies only to the subsoil, the seabed of the continental shelf beyond three miles, and to artificial islands built thereon for the purpose of exploiting the resources of the continental shelf. But the
Submerged Lands Act does not limit coastal state jurisdiction to
structures constructed to exploit natural resources. Since the
United States had practically absolute sovereignty over the territorial sea and gave the seabed to the coastal states in the Submerged Lands Act, coastal states have jurisdiction over all structures erected within three miles of the coast.
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the United States
retains paramountjurisdiction over the seabed and structures built
thereon beyond the three miles seaward from the coast. But under the provisions of this Act, state law will apply in some situations. Section 1333 of this act says:
(a) (1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction
of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided,
however, that mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be
maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter.
(a) (2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the
Secretary now in effect, or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal
laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared to be
the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed
structures erected thereon.

Of course in any particular case it may be uncertain as to
whether state or Federal law applies, thereby opening the contro-

versy to litigation 27 The case of Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 28 reaffirms the principle that Federal law is paramount
in disputes arising over incidents in the outer continental shelf, and
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).
27. See generally, Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of Exploitationof the Continental Shelf: The Santa BarbaraDisaster,9 SAN DiEco
L. REv. 514 (1972).
28. Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).

[voL. 10: 638, 1973]

Artificial Islands
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

29
that state laws are only a surrogate to fill voids in Federal law.
But in Rodrique it was held that there was such a gap, and that
adjacent state law applied to accidental deaths occurring on artifi3°
cial islands.
Furthermore, the United States has the power to regulate the development of the outer continental shelf, and this power includes
the granting of private leases. And since Federal powers are superior to state powers, states cannot inhibit leases given by the
Federal Government for the development of the outer continental
shelf."' In Union Oil Co. of California v. Minier it was held that
to enjoin
state nuisance law could not be applied to a federal lessee
32
its oil drilling activities on the outer continental shelf.

Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Coast Guard
has the authority to make and enforce regulations in regards to

lights, warning devices, and safety equipment on structures erected
on the outer continental shelf. 33 And the Secretary of the Army
has the authority to prevent obstructions to navigation which may
35
be caused by an artificial island. 34 In United States v. Ray it was

held that Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,36 which prohibits construction in a navigable waterway of any structure unless it

has been recommended by 37the Secretary of the Army, extended to
the outer continental shelf.
This power to prevent obstructions to navigation has been used
in several instances to prohibit or stop construction of artificial
islands for non-extractive purposes on the continental shelf. In
United States v. Ray,38 two competing companies had hoped to establish an independent nation on a coral reef approximately 10
miles off the cost of Florida. One company managed to erect four
39
buildings on the reef which were later destroyed by a hurricane.
29. Id. at 357.
30. Id. at 366.
31. Union Oil Co. of California v. Minier, 437 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1970).
32. Id.
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (1).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f).
35. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 403.
37. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 19 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Recent Case, 6 SAN DIEo L. REV. 487 (1969).
39. Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th
Cir. 1967).

In addition to holding that permission from the Secretary of the
Army must be obtained, the court held that the United States had
an injuncsufficient rights, a "vital interest" in the reef, to support
40
tion preventing the developers from building on it.
Similarly, and at approximately the same time, another group
tried to establish a nation 120 miles off the coast of California to
harvest and process abalone. 41 They towed a ship offshore and attempted to sink it on the Cortes Bank. The Corps of Engineers
quickly declared this to be an obstruction to navigation and under
the United States jurisdiction since it was part of the continental
shelf. These entrepreneurs apparently halted their efforts to await
the outcome of United States v. Ray.
The United States has on several occasions denied having jurisdiction over the seabed for non-extractive purposes. Before attempting actual construction, the developers in United States v.
Ray attempted to obtain permission to build from every possible
government agency short of the United Nations, and had been informed that the reef was not within the jurisdiction of either the
United States or Florida. 42 Likewise, in 1918, the Department of
State replied to a request by an individual for a leasehold on a reef
40 miles from the coast in the Gulf of Mexico (upon which he
wished to construct an artificial island for extracting oil), stating
that the United States had no jurisdiction over the ocean bottom
beyond the territorial sea and therefore it could not grant a leasehold. It went on to say that if this artificial island were erected
and did not interfere with the United States or its citizens, then no
43
objections fron the United States were likely to be forthcoming.
Presumably this indicates that the United States will not license an
artificial island for non-extractive purposes, and that it will use its
power to prevent interferences with navigation to stop construction
of an unlicensed artificial island. Furthermore, the Cortes Bank
incident and the decision in United States v. Ray indicate that the
United States has sufficient interest in the continental shelf,
though short of ownership, to prevent anyone else from erecting
structures thereon, and need not rely solely upon the power to prevent interferences with navigation. 44 Indeed it would seem that
40. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1970).

41. For a discussion of both this and United States v. Ray, see Stang,

supra note 2, and Recent Case, 6 SAN DiEo L. Rsv. 487 (1969).
42. Atlantics Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 820-21
(5th Cir. 1967).
43. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

§ 202 at 679-680

(Dep't of State, 1941).
44. See, United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1970); and
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any structure erected on the continental shelf would interfere with
the United States' exclusive rights to the natural resources of the

continental shelf, and the United States could demand its removal.

In the long run, environmental concerns may be the biggest legal
obstacle to artificial islands.45 For example, Delaware has passed
a law specifically prohibiting superports.46 Responding to propo-

sals to build a nuclear power plant off their coast, the New Jersey
Legislature immediately passed a resolution calling for legislation
47
that would bar offshore nuclear power plants.

In

Zabel v.

Tabb,48 it was held that the Secretary of the Army can refuse to issue a permit for a structure on ecological grounds, even if it is not
a hazard to navigation. A superport would be particularly subject to opposition from environmentalists fearing the prospect of oil
or other mineral spills from a huge tanker unloading a few miles
off the coast.49
III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

A State has, essentially, territorial sovereignty over its internal
waters and territorial sea, and hence within these there are no international problems as to the jurisdictional status of artificial islands. Internal waters are those on the landward side of the base
line. 50 This includes bays, lakes, ports, inlets, rivers and harbors.
H. Knight, International and State-Federal Aspects of a Gulf of Mexico
Superport at 13-14, April 27, 1972 (manuscript prepared as a part of staff
study for the Louisiana Superport Task Force, conducted by Louisiana
State University, Office of Sea Grant Develop ement).
45. Letter from John M. Gantus, Office of the General Counsel, Maritime Administration, to Craig W. Walker, December 21, 1972. See Tnvm
March 12, 1973, at 79. See generally, Walmsley, supra note 27.
46. Coastal Zone Act, 7 DEL. C. §§ 7001-7013 (1972 Supp.). Sections

7002 and 7003 of this statute specifically prohibit artificial islands for the
transfer of gas, liquids or solids. On the other hand, Louisiana has just
passed a statute expressly for the purpose of facilitating the planning,
construction and operation of a superport, Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal Authority, 35 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 3101-3114 (1972 Supp.).
47. New York Times, March 21, 1972, at 82, col. 1.
48. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910.
49. Such worries have been voiced in Another SST?, FORBES, April 15,
1971 at 21. See Comment, Maine's Coastal Conveyance of Oil Act: Jurisdictional Considerations,24 AnI L. REv. 299, 309 (1972).
50. C. COLo MBos, THE INTEmATiONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 180, at 175
(6th ed. 1967); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, supra note 1. Art. 5.

Internal waters are national waters and are part of the territory of
the State. They are subject to the control of the coastal State in a
manner similar in degree to land areas. 51 States thus have plenary jurisdiction to build and control activities on any artificial island within their territorial waters. The territorial sea is a belt or
zone adjacent to the coastal State, extending from the base line
seaward, including the atmosphere, water column, subsoil and seabed. 52 The coastal State exercises absolute sovereignty over its
territorial sea, with the exception of rights of innocent passage and
entry in distress. 53 Presently there is no international consensus
on a uniform breadth of the territorial sea. Claims run from three
to 200 miles.54 The United States has indicated a desire for an international agreement fixing the territorial sea at twelve miles,
subject to free passage through those straits which would become
entirely territorial waters if the twelve mile limit is accepted."
Since the coastal State enjoys sovereignty over its territorial sea,
subject to the rights of innocent passage and entry in distress, it
can construct an artificial island and subject it to jurisdiction, as
long as the island does not seriously impede innocent passage."0
Furthermore, it follows that if an artificial island were erected in a
State's territorial waters without its authority, the State would
have jurisdiction over it. But once beyond any State's territorial
sea, we come into the province of international law, and here the
jurisdictional problems are tremendous and there are no formulated answers.
Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw

A State has jurisdiction to deal with any offense committed by
anyone within its territory, without regard to nationality, 7 as well
as jurisdiction over its citizens wherever they may be.18 Generally,
51. M. McDouaAL & W. BuRxE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OcEANs 64
(1962).
52. Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International
Seabed Area; Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts,
8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459, 472-73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Knight, The
Draft United Nations Conventions].
53. Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions, supra note 52 at
473; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 1, Arts. 2, 14 & 15.
54. Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions, supra note 52 at
at 473. For a list of State claims to territorial seas and special zones see:
2 NEW DmEcTIONS IN THE LAW OF T=E SEA 833-69 (S. LAY, R. CauRcHILL, M.

NoRDQuIsT eds. 1973).

55. Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions, supra note 52 at 474.
56. H. Knight, supra note 44, at 3.
57. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 135 (1812); J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 7 at 299 (6th ed. 1963).
58. Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594,
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under the territorial theory of jurisdiction, a State's jurisdiction is
limited to its territory and its citizens. 59 Most nations appear to
accept the territorial theory. 60 However, a major exception is also
generally recognized: the protective theory, which holds that a
State also has jurisdiction in regards to any crime committed out-

side of its territory by an alien which is against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of the State.61 So beyond
a State's territorial sea, jurisdiction is uncertain. If a State wants
to erect an artificial island outside of its territorial waters, does it
have a legal right to do so, and can it govern the activities on the
artificial island? Likewise, what are the legal ramifications if an
individual or a foreign State constructs an artificial island off the
coast of another State? Could the coastal State assert jurisdiction?
Can individuals acting without authority from any State erect and
exercise dominion over an artificial island?
Clearly, these inquiries as to the jurisdiction governing construction and regulation present difficulties within the province of international law. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States: "[W]hatever any nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its common usefulness to nations, or which another nation may charge detracts from it, is a question for consideration
among nations as such..." 62 And by the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case: 63 "The delimination of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be
dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed
in its municipal law."
The Freedom of the High Seas
The primary obstacle under international law preventing uni600 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
927 (1958); J. BimLY, supra note 57, § 7, at 299.
59. The Appollon, 9 Wheat 362, 367 (1824). See also United States v.
Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
60. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); J. BRmIELY,

supra note 57, § 7, at 299-300.
61. United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489; United States v.

Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10; J. Brierly, supra note 57, § 7, at 299-300.

62. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947).
63. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case [1951] I.C.J. 116, 132.

lateral declarations of jurisdiction over artificial islands is the customary freedom of the high seas. Stated very simply, the doctrine
of the freedom of the high seas concedes that the high seas are open
to the common use of all men, and are not the territory of any
State. Mr. Justice Story put it this way: "Upon the ocean... all
possess an entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there."6 4 The Convention on the
High Seas also declares the freedom of the high seas:
Article 2
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises inter
alia, both for the coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas.65

As so often seems the case in law, underlying a supposed rule is
a tremendous conflict. There is a fundamental split as to what this
rule of the freedom of the high seas means.
There are two points to make about the Convention's statement
as to freedom of the high seas:
(1) It refers only to States. Thus it may be argued that only
States or individuals acting in the name of a State may invoke the
doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, and an individual not acting under the authority of a State would have practically no rights.
There is some authority for this view. Sir Humphrey Waldock has
stated that "The freedoms of the High seas are the freedoms of
'
States, not of individuals."66
Sir Humphrey cites the case of Naim
64. The Marrianna Flora, 11 Wheat 1, 42 (1826).
65. Convention on the High Seas; 1964 pt. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958; entered into force for the
United States September 30, 1962.
66. Waldock, The R.E.M. Broadcasting Station and the Equipments
North Sea Act in RECHTSGELEERDE ADVizEN 22, 35, July 22, 1964 (opinions

of five international law scholars, C. John Colombos, David H.N. Johnson, Charles Rousseau, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Henri Rolin and Frans de
Pauw, for the R.E.M., a pirate radio station being threatened by prosecution under the North Sea Installation Act infra. Additionally, it is a
matter of dispute whether international law applies to individuals or only
to relations between States. Only States can appear before the Interna-
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v. Attorney General for Palestine in which the British Privy Council held that a ship without a flag did not fall within the freedom
of the seas and could be seized without there being a breach in in-

ternational law.67 If this is true, then it would seem that an individual acting on his own cannot validly erect an artificial island
on the high seas and if he did, any State would be virtually free to
seize it.68
(2) The Convention on the High Seas declares that no State
may validly subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty, but
it then relates a list of freedoms, stating that these, inter alia, comprise the freedom of the high seas, and furthermore, that "[t]hese
freedoms and others which are recognized by the general principles
of international law ...

,"69 This open-ended criterion leaves open

to discussion and dispute the question of just what are the freedoms of the high seas.
There is a strict view that only a limited number of freedoms
are allowed. As stated by C. John Columbos: "That the fact that
a given act is not prohibited by international law does not imply
that it is allowable. Any interference with the freedom of the
tional Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, art. 34, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1059, T.S. No. 933; entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945; But see

1

M. WHITFAw, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

§ 2, at 50-58 (Dep't of State 1963).
67. Naim Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine [1948] A.C. 351, 369
(Palestine). Of course this case only reflects the British view, but it is
supported by the Convention on the High Seas which implies that ships
must fly flags and that only States have the authority to authorize a ship
to fly a flag. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 65, arts. 4, 5, & 6.
68. A related issue is whether an individual can legally, that is under
international law, form his own sovereign nation. As mentioned supra

there have been several attempts by individuals to form sovereign nations
on artificial islands. In 1944 an individual who claimed to have estab-

lished a method for making the seabed accessible to human exploitation,
claimed title and dominion over an area of the seabed. The Department
of State informed him that individuals or private concerns could not acquire dominion over lands beneath the high seas for themselves. 4 M.
WBTE1mAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw, § 1, at 740

(Dep't of

State,

1965). See also, Browning, Exploitation of Submarine Mineral Resources
Beyond the Continental Shelf, 4 TEXAS INT'L L. FoRUm 1, 14 (1968).
Contra, Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat 543 (1823); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 319 U.S. 748.
69. van Panhuys & Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting, A
Dutch Approach, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 303, 313 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
van Panhuys]. See McDOUGAL AND BuRKE, supra note 51, at 82-83.

seas must be clearly expressed and cannot be presumed.17 0 This
view seems to hold that freedom of navigation, that is free travel
on the high seas for purposes of transportation, is the basic freedom
of the high seas, and all other uses, especially those that interfere
with navigation, are subject to qualification or limitation." Under this strict view, the high seas are res communis, for the common use of all nations. It follows that for all nations to use the
high seas in common, none can appropriate any part or proscribe
its use to the exclusion of others.7 2 Under this strict view, a State's
declaration of jurisdiction to construct or control activities on an
artificial island would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas, 3
destroying, as it would, the principle of res communis.
Some commentators have a contrary opinion. This "liberal" view
contends that under the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas,
States are free to make any peaceful use of the high seas, subject
only to a test of reasonableness as to potential interference with
other uses of the high seas. 74 This view is based upon its advocates'
opinion that historically the freedom of the seas was a broad concept, allowing a wide variety of acts as long as they did not unreasonably conflict with some other nation's use. Advocates of this
proposition claim additional support by their analysis of the Convention on the High Seas and the debates precedent to its formu75
lation.
Sir Humphrey Waldock is an outspoken proponent of the liberal
view. He has said: "The right of a State to make whatever use it
thinks fit of the high seas has never really been challenged, except
on the basis that the particular use in question consituted an unreasonable interference with the rights of other States upon the
high seas.176 In applying his views to artificial islands he says:
"Both the Geneva Convention of 1958 and State practice thus sup70. Colombos, In the Matter of the So-Called Anti-R.E.M.-Law, in
RECHTSGELEEDE ADviEzEN, supra note 66, at 4.

71. See COLOMBOS, supra note 50, § 79; and Report of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly 1956, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMm'N
253, 299, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
72. COLODABoS, supra note 50, § 79; Dean, The Second Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L
L. 751, 756-57 (1960); Knuz, Continental Shelf and International Law:
Confusion and Abuse, 50 A.m. J. INrL L. 828-829.
73. van Panhuys, supra note 69, at 315.
74. See McDouc.AL & BuRKE, supra note 51, at 759, 763; van Panhuys,
supra note 69, at 338-39; Johnson, The Amended Draft Bill (Equipments
North Sea Act) Sponsored by the Netherlands Government, in P ciiTsHELEERDE ADviEzEN, supra note 66, at 6; and Waldock, supra note 66, at 23-24
75. See authorities listed at note 74 supra.

76. Waldock, supra note 66, at 24.
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port the view that the erection of an artificial structure on the sea
bed of the high seas in an act which in itself falls within and is
sanctioned by the principle of the freedom of the high seas."' 77 In
off the
Waldoek's opinion, one State could place an artificial island
78
coast of another and the coastal State could not interfere.
A historical basis for this liberal view is that the high seas are
res nullius, not presently occupied but subject to the sovereignty
of a nation by occupation. 79 This concept of the high seas evolved
at a time when the high seas and seabed were incapable of being
occupied and when no known peaceful use would interfere with the
uses of other nations. Since now, by the use of artificial islands,
areas of the high seas can be occupied, the concept of res nullius
would allow these portions of the high seas to become the territory
of the occupying State.
The Convention on the High Seas specifically prohibits subject-

ing any part of the high seas to the sovereignty of any State. An
artificial island does just that: it subjects a formerly common area
to one State's control and use. If States were allowed to do this
freely, large areas of the high seas could foreseeably come under

the sovereignty of individual States. Certainly this would tend to
be true of areas where there is any special attraction, such as sites
rich in mineral resources, hydrocarbons, or perhaps near fishing
grounds. "Choice" locations would be taken as quickly as possible
by the States with the most advanced technology, leaving little of
the riches of the high seas to the less developed or landlocked
States. Erecting artificial islands on the high seas is, of course, subject to certain physical limitations. The chosen sites must be
relatively shallow before the project can be considered feasible.
While suitable localities are by no means common, they are existent
and are being thoroughly mapped. Seamounts are some of the
more notable potential sites, as they rise far above the seabed in
many instances.8 0
Also to be considered is the strong possibility of conflict as States
compete for the wealth of the high seas. Add to this the spectre
77. Id. at 25.
78. Waldoclk supra note 66, at 26.
79. CoToNamos, supra note 50, 79.
80. Note, Seamounts and Guyots: A Unique Resource, 10 SAx DIEGO L.
REv. 599 (1973).

of unfriendly nations building artificial islands off each other's
coasts, and the probability of conflict approaches certainty. The
strict interpretation of the freedom of the high seas would avoid
these anomolous results. At the same time it does not prohibit the
international community from creating a regime prescribing jurisdiction over artificial islands of all uses.
ArtificialIslands on the Continental Shelf

The Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was done at
Geneva at the same time as the Convention on the High Seas and
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, did
allow a limited encroachment to the freedom of the high seas, in
favor of the coastal State. Under this Convention, the continental
shelf is "[T] he seabed and subsoil . . .adjacent to the coast but out-

side the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources... ."s' The
coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf
for the purpose of exploiting its natural resources, 82 but the superjacent waters retain their character as high seas.83 Coastal States
are given jurisdiction to construct and operate installations necessary for exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of
the continental shelf.84 These installations do not have the legal
status of natural islands and hence do not have a territorial sea,
but they are allowed a 500 metre safety zone.8 5
Unresolved questions still exist as to the jurisdictional effects of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf with regards to artificial
islands unassociated with the exploitation of natural resources.
An interpretation that the Convention prohibits such artificial islands would not be entirely unsupported. The International Law
Commission (I.L.C.), which was the prepatory body for the 1958
Conventions, reported in its commentary to the draft articles which
dealt with installations for extractive purposes:
The case is clearly one of assessment of the relative importance of
the interests involved. Interference, even if substantial, with navigation, might in some cases be justified. On the other hand, interference even on an insignificant scale would be unjustified if unre81. Convention on the Continental Shelf; [1964) pt. 1, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958; entered
into force June 10, 1964, Art. 1.
82. Id., Art. 2.
83. Id.
84. Id., Art. 5.
85. Id.
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lated to reasonably conceived requirements of exploration and exploitationof the continentalshelf.86 (emphasis added)

However, the weight of evidence suggests that the Convention
is neutral in regards to non-extractive artificial islands. If the doctrine of inclusio uinus est exclusio aterius is applied, the Convention gives the coastal State exclusive jurisdiction only over artificial islands for extractive purposes, and leaves all other uses to be
judged under the general doctrine of the freedom of the seas.8 7
Sir Humphrey Waldock believes that prior to the Convention it
was recognized that States could construct drilling installations on
the high seas for the purpose of exploiting natural resources, and
that the primary issue of the Convention was merely whether the

coastal State had exclusive rights to the natural resources of the
seabed, and thus the status of other uses continues to be unaffected.88

Dr. Mouton, a specialist on the continental shelf, noted that the
I.LC. was concerned chiefly with the question of exploration and
exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf, and
had not intended that their recommendations deal with other uses
of the continental shelf.8 9 Professors van Panhuys and Boas are
also of that opinion: "The history of the Conference shows, however, that the drafters of the Convention did not entirely rule out a
potential use of the continental shelf for other installations,... although they were of the opinion that the Conference was not the
proper place to examine that subject."90
What discussion there was about artificial islands for non-extractive purposes precipitating the convention was, for the most part,
concerned with the possibility that if they were allowed to have a
territorial sea, they would be used to extend coastal States' territorial waters. During the 1954 I.L.C. discussions on artificial islands, many differing views were presented. But the main or underlying concern was whether artificial islands should have a territorial sea in light of the possibility that States might wrongfully
86. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly 1956, 2 Y B. I '.L. COMM'N 253, 299, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
87. H. Knight, supra note 44, at 10; Waldock, supra note 66, at 25.

88. Waldock, supra note 66, at 25. See also CoLoxMos, supra note 50,
§ 91A.
89. Reported in McDouGAL & BuRmE, supranote 51, at 717.
90. van Panhuys, supra note 69, at 321.

use artificial islands to extend their territorial waters.0

1

Addition-

ally there were several comments to the effect that artificial islands would be in violation of the freedom of the high seas per se.92
Some commentators felt that the question of artificial islands
should be considered separately, 93 while others expressed the opinion that artificial islands could be beneficial and therefore should
not be discouraged. 4
The definition that emerged was: "An island is an area of land
surrounded by water which is under normal circumstances permanently above the high-water mark."9 5 Under this definition a manmade island of sand and rock would be an island and thus have a
territorial sea. Significantly, the Commission rejected by vote an
amendment which would have added the word "natural" before the
words "area of land".96 The question of whether offshore structures could be erected was not resolved, but it seemed settled that
if they were, they would not have a territorial sea but would be
97
allowed a safety zone.

The above definition of islands was changed during the 1958 Convention by the addition of the word "natural" as had previously
been proposed in 1954.98

Thus artificial islands, regardless of their

composition, are not allowed a territorial sea. An aura of suspicion
as to the extension of coastal State territorial waters appears to
have prevented use of language broad enough to include jurisdiction over installations other than for extractive purposes.9 9
Some States felt that coastal States should be given sovereignty
over the continental shelf for a variety of purposes, including the
right to prohibit installations not designed for extractive purposes. 10 0 It was feared, however, that the term "sovereignty"
would allow claims to the high seas above the continental shelf and
this was not desired.' 0 '
If this view, that the Conventions are neutral in regards to artificial islands (except for the strong feelings which were expressed
91. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Co1nw'iN 91, U.N. Doe. A/CN. 4/77 (1954), see paras.
9-16, 24, 26-28, 33, 38-39, 48, 54. Lauterpacht also echoes these fears in
Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 411 (1950).
92. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 90, at 92.
93. Id. at 92-94.
94. Id. at 94.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See 4 M. Wm
AN, supra note 68, § 8 at 303.
98. McDoucGu. &Bu=xE, supra note 51 at 397.
99. Id. at 699-700.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 700.
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prior to their formulation against allowing the possibility of any
extension of territorial waters by artificial islands) is correct, then
a declaration of jurisdiction to build and control activities on artificial islands on the continental shelf which expressly denies any
claims to territorial waters for such artificial islands would not be
contrary to the intent of the Conventions. However, such a declaration would be subject to approval by the international community,
and would best be made pursuant to an international regime governing jurisdiction over all types of artificial islands.
Roadsteads
Under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, a strong case can be made for coastal State jurisdiction over
superports. Article 9 of this Convention provides that: "Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated wholly or
partially outside the outer limit of the territorial sea, are included
in the territorial sea. '10 2 The question remains whether superports
can be considered roadsteads. Logically it would seem that they
could be, since a superport and a roadstead have virtually identical
03
purposes: the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships.'
On the other hand, it has been contended that roadsteads must be
enclosed, in part, by natural areas of land, thus ruling out artificial
island superports on the high seas. 10 4 P. Pradier-Fodere says that
roadsteads are partially enclosed by land that is more or less
raised. However, several writers have defined roadsteads in terms
that would include superports. P. Gidel defined roadsteads as
being adjacent to ports and receiving ships in natural or artifiAnd Paul Fauchille says that closed roadsteads are
cial basins. 10
constituted by artificial works or are naturally enclosed and are a

portion of the maritime territory of a State. 0 7 Although there is

102. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra

note 1, Art. 9.
103. H. Knight, supra note 44, at 18.
104. Id. at 19.
105.

PRAIDER-FODLR9, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 211, quoted

in 4 M. WHiTEmAN, supra note 68, § 8, at 265.
106. P. GIDEL, LE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc DE LA ME

22-25, quoted

in 4 M. WHnmmAN, supra note 68, § 8, at 264.
107. 1 FAUCHILLE, TRAiTP DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBLic pt. 2, at 395,

quoted in 4 M. WHmTEMAN, supra note 68, § 8, at 265.

a split of opinion, under the above authority, superports can validly be considered roadsteads and be included in the coastal State's
territorial sea. As I. Gary Knight has said:
I am of the opinion, in view of the legislative history of the Territorial Sea Convention and recent technological advances in port
construction, that a superport facility could be validly assimilated to
a roadstead and that territorial sea jurisdiction would therefore be
applicable under Article 9.108

1973 Conference on the Law of the Seas
In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
calling for a conference in 1973 on the law of the seas. 0 9 Many of
the issues discussed here, including artificial islands, are scheduled
to be considered at this conference. 1 0 The following proposal,
giving the coastal State jurisdiction to construct and jurisdiction
over activities on artificial islands, was made by Dr. Arvid Prado
to the United Nations Seabed Committee, which is the preparatory
group for the 1973 Conference, on August 23, 1971."'
Article 62
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the coastal State may
construct, and maintain or operate on or under the seabed of national ocean space [from the coastline to 200 miles seaward thereof]
habitats, installations, equipment and devices for peaceful purposes
Article 63
The coastal State may construct and maintain or operate in national
ocean space artificial islands, floating harbors or other installations
for peaceful purposes, anchored to the seabed...
The coastal State has inherently greater interest in the ocean

appurtenant to its coast than the international community and so
it should have primary jurisdiction over all artificial islands adjacent to its coast, no matter what their use. But at some point in

distance seaward, coastal State jurisdiction must be proscribed by
international jurisdiction. Almost all proposals for the 1973 Conference contemplate an international agency with significant rulemaing and regulatory authority with respect to the exploitation
of seabed minerals." 2 The same scheme of coastal State-Interna108. I Knight, supra note 44, at 18.
109. G.A. Res. 2750 C (XXV)

(1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATE AxS 226

(1971).

110. A tentative list of subjects to be covered can be found in 9 SAN
DIEao L. REv. 600-03 (1972).

111. Draft Ocean Space Treaty: Working Paper Submitted by Malta,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/53 (Aug. 23, 1971), quoted in H. Knight, supra note
44, at 12 (the information in brackets is his).
112. Stevenson, Who is to Control the Oceans: United States Policy
and the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, 6 INT'L LAw. 465, 475 (1972).
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tional control should apply to artificial islands of all uses so as to
preserve the freedom of the high seas, provide for its orderly development, and allow those nations which are unable on their own
to exploit the oceans to share in the wealth of the hydrospace.
IV.

EXISTING CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OVER ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

The Legal Vacuum Theory
Beginning in about 1958, a number of radio broadcasting stations
located either on ships or on fixed structures began operating from
outside the territorial waters of a number of West European countries." 3

These so-called "pirate" broadcasting stations were in di-

rect competition with the government owned stations of these
countries. Seeking to protect their interests, the affected nations
utilized a number of diverse legal methods to prohibit the "pirate"
broadcasting stations. On December 3, 1964, the Netherlands invoked the North Sea Installations Act,"-4 which extended the criminal law of the Netherlands to installations on the continental shelf
appurtenant to the Netherlands. The validity of this Act, as to international law, was partially justified by the legal vacuum doctrine. 15
Basically, the legal vacuum theory relates that if there is an occurrence that is not covered by existing international law, then the
State affected by this transpiration is free to formulate rules to
meet the problems thus created. Applied to artificial islands, the
doctrine would be: although technology has created the need for,
and the ability to build, artificial islands, presently there are no applicable laws, hence the coastal States are free to enact appropriate
laws extending their jurisdiction to artificial islands contiguous
to their coasts. This doctrine could serve as a basis for both jurisdiction to construct and jurisdiction to control activities on artificial islands.
For a discussion of various proposals that have been submitted for the
1973 Conference see Id.; and Stang, The Donnybrook Fair of the Oceans, 9
SAN Dmo L. REV. 569 (1972).

113. For a discussion of the pirate radio broadcasting problem see:

Hunnings, supra note 6; Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REv.
769 (1968); van Panhuys, supranote 69.
114. This Act appears in 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 340-41 (1966).
115. van Panhuys, supra note 69, at 337.

The legal vacuum theory has been profoundly assailed on the
grounds that there are no legal vacuums in international law, since
existing principles can be applied to new situations. For example,
it is contended that jurisdiction over the pirate broadcasters is
vested in the state of their citizenship, and therefore there is no legal vacuum. 116 In 1955 the Permanent United States Delegation,
denying the existence of a legal vacuum on the high seas, made the
following statement to the United Nations:
It must be pointed out that the high seas are an area under a definite and established legal status which requires freedom of navigation and use for all. They are not an area in which a legal vacuum
exists, free to be filled by individual states, strong or weak." 7 (em-

phasis added)

Nevertheless, there is substantial opinion to the effect that there
is such a thing as a legal vacuum. It was no less renowned an
authority than J.P.A. Francois who first advocated the doctrine 118
Basing a new law on the legal vacuum theory is like killing flies
with a shotgun: it's more than you need, and there is a good chance
it will not work. It should not be necessary to find a vacuum before new laws can be established. Furthermore it is not agreed
that there are any legal vacuums at all. So any law justified by
this doctrine is sure to be surrounded by arguments as to whether
there exists a legal vacuum or not. These arguments would cloud
any discussion on the merits of the law. When there is need for a
new law or a change in existing law, the law proposed to meet this
need would be better based on a showing of this need, which can be
something less than a vacuum of law, and of the reasonableness of
the law proposed to meet that need. Any particular doctrine of
international law, ipso facto, affects a number of States. A proposed new doctrine must take these effects into consideration. The
need for the new law can be something less than a vacuum, but it
must be great enough to justify an interference with the rights of
other States. The test would be one of reasonableness: a balancing
of the rights and interests of individual States and the international
community. The international community will be the ultimate
judge of the new law since its validity depends upon their acceptance.
116. Waldock, supra note 66, at 31. See generally H.

PALS OF INTERwATioAL LAW 438 (2d ed. 1966).
117. Quoted in 4 M. WmEAN, supra note 68,

KELSON,

§ 2 at 54-55.

PRXNcx-

118. van Panhuys, supra note 69, at 322. See also 6 SAN DIEGo L. Rzv.
497, at n.59 (1969); The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea, 19th
Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 13 (March
1969).
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The ContiguousZone as a Basis for Coastal State
Jurisdictionover Artificial Islands

The basic concept of the contiguous zone is an area of limited jurisdiction over a zone of the high seas contiguous to a State, wherein

the State may exercise jurisdiction for specific purposes. Traditionally, this jurisdiction has been limited to police powers over
customs and immigration. The Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone limited the contiguous zone to 12 miles and
declared coastal State power to: "[P]revent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territorial sea .... "119

Myers McDougal and William Burke feel that this is far too limited an application of the contiguous zone and urge extended application of its concept to new uses of the high seas: "[T] he more
economic device of contiguous zone is available for protection of all
reasonable interests of the coastal state without endangering the
inclusive, common use of the sea. 1 20 They feel that the concept of
the contiguous zone, and indeed the entire law of the sea, was for2
merly flexible and would allow for uses other than navigation,' '
and that by limiting it to 12 miles, and at the same time adherance
to an absolute freedom of the high seas, forces expanded claims to
territorial waters and interferes with emerging uses. 12 2 Their test
for deciding what uses may be made of the high seas is one of rea-

sonableness, a balancing of exclusive and inclusive claims. 123 Their
concept of the contiguous zone includes all claims on the high seas
for a particular purpose which have a geographical nexus to the
coastal State. 124 Included are such claims as exclusive fishing
zones, and exclusive rights to the natural resources of the continental shelf.125
119. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra

note 1, Art. 24.
120. McDouGAL & BuRKE, supra note 51, at 12.

121. Id. at 81, 82, 84 n.188, 86.
122. Id. at 6 n.19, 606-07. See also McDougal in THE LAW

OF THE SEA 3,
18-20 (M. Alexander ed. 1967); and Lauterpacht, supra note 90, at 408.
123. McDouGAL & BuRKE, supra note 51, at 13, n.32. Knuz, supra
note 72, at 830 states that Lauterpacht, Francois and Phleger all agree on
practically the same balancing and reasonableness test.

124. McDouGAL & Buaxa, supra note 51, at 565-66.
125. Id. at 630-31.

An example of such a balancing of exclusive and inclusive interests in the United States' policy is this statement by John R. Stevenson, the Legal Advisor of the Department of State and United
States Representative on the United Nations Seabed Committee:
In general, the United States has urged that coastal States' interest
in control over the resources of their coast, be reconciled with the
international community's interest in other uses of the area ....120

McDougal and Burke's emphasis on the flexibility of the law of
the sea, especially in regard to the contiguous zone, and its ability
to accommodate changing conditions seems to be relatively
unique.121 It is valuable for emphasizing that international law
can and should change to accommodate new uses, and for suggesting the test of reasonableness-balancing the exclusive needs of the
coastal state and the inclusive needs of the international community.
Their theories can be very profitably applied to the question of
jurisdiction over artificial islands. In fact, they conclude that
the coastal States should have exclusive control over any use of the
continental shelf which requires fixed installations. 12 8
A Change in InternationalLaw
International law is not a rigid, unchanging set of rules. It is in a
continual state of flux, sometimes confronting issues and problems
quickly, sometimes slowly. 29 Professor Lauterpacht has this to
say about a change in the freedom of the seas:
The principle of the freedom of the seas cannot be treated as a rigid
dogma incapable of adaptation to situations which were outside the
when that principle
realm of practical possibilities in the period
first became part of international law.130
An excellent example of change in international law is the emergence of coastal State jurisdiction over the natural resources in the

adjacent continental shelf. The doctrine of the continental shelf
was not a development of a pre-existing international norm. It
was a completely novel development.' 3 ' Underwater drilling for

oil began in the 1890's off piers on the California coast. 132 For

126. Stevenson,supra note 111 at 474.
127. Ian Brownlie, in his book PRMCIPALS OF PUBLic IrElNAMONAL

at 196 n.4 (1966), says that McDouaAL & BunIE apply the rubric of
the Contiguous zone too widely.
128. McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 51, at 719. But see W. Burke in
THE LAW OF HE SEA 204, at 209-12 (M. Alexander ed. 1967).
129. 1 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 at 1 (Dep't of
LAW

State 1963).

130. Lauterpacht, supra note 90, at 399. For a stronger statement of the
need for change see 48 Am. J. IN'L L. 173, 178 (1946).
131. Knuz, supra note 72, at 830.
132. G. MANGoNE, THME UNTE NATIoNs: INTERNAT NAL LAw ANI T E
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practical purposes, coastal State jurisdiction over the minerals of

the continental shelf began with the Truman Proclamation of
1945,133 in which President Truman declared that the natural resources of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States

were subject to the jurisdiction and control of the United States.
The reasons for this unilateral extension of jurisdiction were
stated in the Proclamation: due to a need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, to encourage discovery of new sources
of these resources, because the continental shelf contains many of
these resources, recognized jurisdiction is required for proper conservation and utilization of these resources, and since the continental shelf is an extension of the land mass of the coastal State
and thus naturally appurtenant to it, and since self-protection of
the coastal State and cooperation and protection from the shore
134
are necessary.
In 1958, the newly created Convention on the Continental Shelf
provided that: "The Coastal State exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."'135 And in 1969, the International Court
of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases recognized
that coastal State jurisdiction for the purpose of exploiting the nat136
ural resources of the continental shelf had become a rule of law.
Besides being an example of a change in international law, this is
also an example of how a unilateral declaration of jurisdiction
based upon a showing of the need and the reasonableness of the
law proposed to meet the need, can 'develop into accepted international law. A similar though not desirable declaration of jurison the continental shelf could well
diction over all structures built
37
results.
similar
with
be made
SEAs 8 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Ocean Series 303, Jan. 1972).

BED Or m

133. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp. at 67 (1945); 13
DEP'T STATE BuLL. 485 (Sept. 30, 1945).

134. Id.
135. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supranote 80, Art. 2.
136. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. 3, para. 19.

See

also Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Critique, 64
Am. J. INT'L L. 229, 232 (1970).

137. H. Knight, supra note 44, at 7.

V. A LEGAL

REGIME FOR ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

Several authorities advocate exclusive coastal State authority
over any use of the continental shelf which requires fixed installations.18 8 Beyond the continental shelf, artificial islands and other
permanent installations should be subject to international control.
As international law now stands, the questions who, what, where

and what laws will govern cannot be answered. The only certainty
is that a coastal State can erect and control the activities on an artificial island within its internal and territorial waters. An international regime is necessary to completely solve the jurisdictional issues of artificial islands. Hopefully, the forthcoming Conference
on the Law of the Sea will result in such a regime. Failure to
adopt a regime has grave consequences. It would practically force
nations desiring and needing to make use of artificial islands for
non-extractive purposes beyond their territorial seas to unilaterally declare jurisdiction to build and control them. Such unilateral
declarations have a very strong precedent in the Truman Proclamation of 1945. The danger in unilateral declarations is that they
may be contrary to the interests of the international community,
subjecting large areas of the formerly free high seas to the jurisdiction and control of individual States, severely impairing the
freedom of the seas and allowing the more technologically advanced, wealthy nations to grab the bounty of the seas for their exclusive use. Even a well-intended, reasonable and necessary
unilateral declaration of extended coastal State jurisdiction is
dangerous in that other nations may base an unreasonable unilateral declaration of jurisdiction on prior reasonable and necessary ones. The classic examples are the declarations of several
South American countries of a 200 mile territorial sea-which
were based, in part, upon the Truman Proclamation. Furthermore, there is the grave problem of pollution, and the meritorious desire to limit the high seas to peaceful uses, both of which can
only be effected by international proscriptions.
International law can and does change to adapt to new circumstances. The evolution of the necessity for and the capability to

build artificial islands is such a new circumstance. Currently, the
lack of certainty of jurisdiction over artificial islands for non-extractive purposes greatly hinders their use, and raises a possibility
of creation of artificial islands detrimental to the interests of both
138. See MCDOUGAL & BumR,

supra note 51, at 719; Knight, For-

ward: Law of the Sea Negotiations 1971-1972, From Internationalism to
Nationalism, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383, 389 (1972).
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the international community and the individual coastal States.
Therefore, an international regime encompassing artificial islands
for all uses is necessary and proper.
Such a regime should recognize that the coastal State has inherent, paramount economic and security interests in the seas appurtenant to its coast and is best able to promote and protect these interests and should thus have primary jurisdiction to construct and
control activities on artificial islands within an area encompassing
some distance seaward, whch would be set by agreement among
nations. The coastal State's jurisdiction within this area should
not be exclusive: there should be international machinery, perhaps
a special commission, to insure that the freedom of the seas is preserved, that pollution is controlled, and that only reasonable and
peaceful uses are effectuated. This should be an expressly limited
extension of coastal State authority; the waters should retain their
character as high seas. Each particular artificial island must be
justified by balancing its benefit to the coastal State with its interference with the freedom of the high seas and with the pollution it
causes. No artificial island should have a territorial sea, but
should be allowed a safety zone that would vary in width and in
the type of acts prohibited within it, according to the requirements
of the use of the particular island. For example, an offshore airport would require a safety zone in the air as well as on the water.
Beyond the area of primary coastal State jurisdiction the construction and use of artificial islands should be under the exclusive

control of the international community for the benefit of all States,
especially the landlocked, the shelf-locked, and the underdeveloped.
The creation of this regime will take a great deal of planning, negotiation, and goodwill, especially on the part of the developed
countries who, in essence, will be giving up the opportunity to exercise their greater ability to reap the wealth of the oceans on a firstcome, first-served basis. But they should realize that they will
gain insured freedom of the seas, insured peaceful use of the seas,
and control of pollution: in general, an orderly development of the
oceans which is beneficial to all nations and which surpasses any
limited benefits which might accrue to a few nations from a laissezfaire attitude toward artificial islands.
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